Promises, Promises, …
研究具有双曲贴现特征的个体在做出承诺时的行为，分析承诺被遵守或打破的条件，并从声誉损失和财务损失角度解释承诺的成本，说明个体间的策略互动可缓解内部冲突。
We consider a hyperbolic discounting individual who has the ability to make promises which are costly to break. We first identify conditions under which promises made are kept, and conditions under which they are (partially) broken. Second, we provide microeconomic foundations for the effectiveness of contractual promises. Specifically, we show how the cost of breaking promises can be reinterpreted in terms of either a reputation loss in the presence of incomplete information or a financial loss under monitoring and explicit contracting. The results imply that strategic interactions between hyperbolic discounting individuals may serve as a commitment mechanism against intrapersonal conflicts. © Journal compilation © 2008 by the Royal Economic Society.