Rational Inattention in the Infield
研究经验丰富的专业人士在策略互动中是否存在理性疏忽，利用美国职业棒球大联盟数百万投球数据检验模型预测，发现球员对收益差异的反应受注意力成本影响。
This paper provides evidence of rational inattention by experienced professionals in strategic interactions. We add rational inattention to a game of matching pennies with state-dependent payoffs. Unlike the full-information, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, payoffs of different actions need not be equated state by state. Moreover, players respond partially to payoff differences, this responsiveness is stronger when attention costs are lower, strategies converge to full-information Nash as stakes increase, and average payoffs across all states are approximately equal across actions. We test these predictions using data on millions of pitches from Major League Baseball, where we observe strategies, payoffs, and proxies for attention costs.