Innovation, on-the-job learning, and labor contracts: an organizational equilibria approach
建立模型说明企业技术创新与用工策略之间存在互补性：当企业无法协调不同领域的行动时，会出现两种均衡——高路均衡（更多创新项目+永久雇佣）和低路均衡（更多常规项目+临时雇佣）。
Abstract An established tenet of the literature is that the use of flexible labor leads to less innovation. Yet, less attention has been paid to the possibility that it is the decision to innovate that generates the incentive to hire on a permanent basis. The goal of this paper is to show the existence of interlocking complementarities between the firm's technological and hiring strategies. To do so, we develop a simple model where the workers’ decision to invest in human capital is affected by the type of employment contract (temporary versus permanent) and by the type of technological investments (routine versus innovative). When the firm is unable to coordinate its actions across these different domains, two equilibria simultaneously exist: in the ‘high-road’ equilibrium, firms invest more in innovative projects and hire on a permanent basis; in the ‘low-road’ equilibrium, they invest more in routine projects and hire on a temporary basis.