How quality reporting reduces accountability deficit and overload
研究质量报告如何在多委托方情境下减少问责赤字与过载，基于布什政府项目评估评级工具的数据分析发现，高质量报告能提升绩效评级并影响预算建议。
A critical issue in public accountability is how to reduce chances for dysfunctionalities. This research addresses it by examining both theoretically and empirically how quality reporting may reduce accountability deficit and overload in a multi-principal setting. Analyses of data from the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) during the Bush Administration show that programs exhibiting higher reporting quality attained higher performance ratings, which, in turn, led to larger budgetary recommendations. Higher reporting quality also helped reduce the differences between presidential and congressional budgetary decisions. This article contributes to developing a contingent, process-based theory of public accountability.