Under What Conditions Does the Manager Withhold Segment Information?
构建多期模型，研究管理者在资本市场中如何决定披露或隐瞒分部信息，发现当管理者关注当前股价时，披露更细化的信息未必提高监督效率，反而可能因市场对不同分部盈利的差异化估值导致管理者行为扭曲，从而在特定条件下隐瞒信息反而能提升社会福利。
This paper considers how a manager decides to disclose or withhold segment information in a capital market setting. In particular, we develop a multi-period model in which a manager in each period decides how to allocate her effort between two businesses. The profit earned in each segment is determined by the manager’s effort and ability as well as each segment’s market profitability and inherent uncertainty. In this setting, in contrast to the expectation of segment disclosure being withheld due to conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, we identify the conditions under which the manager rationally withholds segment information and achieves higher social welfare. In a setting where the manager is concerned about the current stock price, disclosing more disaggregated information to the stock market does not necessarily lead to more efficient monitoring. The capital market values various segment earnings differently, and in response to this valuation, a rational manager may greatly alter her behavior, leading to inefficient outcomes.