Do Managers Issue More Voluntary Disclosure When GAAP Limits Their Reporting Discretion in Financial Statements?
研究发现，当通用会计准则限制管理者在财务报表中的自由裁量权时，他们更可能披露非公认会计原则盈利、发布更多管理层预测，并提供更长但更易读的管理层讨论与分析。
ABSTRACT We examine whether managers provide more voluntary disclosure when GAAP limits their reporting discretion in financial statements. We find managers are more likely to disclose non‐GAAP earnings, issue more management forecasts, and provide longer yet more readable management discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosures when GAAP limits their discretion. These effects are stronger when there is greater demand for information and better monitoring. In contrast, these effects are weaker when managers have incentives to manage earnings. Difference‐in‐differences analyses around standard changes provide further evidence that managers make more non‐GAAP adjustments and are more likely to discuss the standard and its underlying transaction in the MD&A when a new standard limits their discretion more than its predecessor. Collectively, our results suggest managers use voluntary disclosure channels to convey information when GAAP limits their ability to recognize such information in financial statements.