Long-Term Labor Market Consequences of Costly Signaling: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
研究印度某邦提高高中毕业考试作弊惩罚的改革，发现该改革导致毕业率大幅下降，但提高了受影响群体的平均工资和毕业生工资溢价，表明改革降低了高能力者通过文凭传递信号的相对成本。
We study a unique reform in an Indian state that increased penalties for cheating on public exams required for high school graduation. This led to a massive decline in percentages of students graduating high school. Average wages for those subject to the reform and also the premium for the students graduating have increased over the next decade or so. We interpret the reform as reducing the cost of signaling high ability by obtaining a diploma, thereby potentially leading to a shift from a pooling to a separating equilibrium.