妥协于妥协规则

Compromising on compromise rules

RAND Journal of Economics · 2022
被引 1
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

提出三种机制帮助对立双方达成妥协,基于“k名规则”让一方提出短名单、另一方选择,适用于最高法院大法官任命和仲裁员遴选,机制灵活且能实现一致同意妥协集。

Abstract

Abstract We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, implement the Unanimity Compromise Set, and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.

妥协规则短名单机制一致妥协集策略性候选人纳入