VACCINE HESITANCY, PASSPORTS, AND THE DEMAND FOR VACCINATION
在一个行为流行病学模型中，将疫苗犹豫视为内生决策，发现直接降低接种成本的干预能有效应对犹豫，而疫苗护照等降低未接种者效用的政策反而可能因疾病流行率下降而减少接种需求。
Abstract Vaccine hesitancy is modeled as an endogenous decision within a behavioral epidemiological model with endogenous agent activity. It is shown that policy interventions that directly target costs associated with vaccine adoption may counter vaccine hesitancy whereas those that manipulate the utility of unvaccinated agents will either lead to the same or lower rates of vaccine adoption. This latter effect arises with vaccine passports whose effects are mitigated in equilibrium by reductions in viral/disease prevalence that themselves reduce the demand for vaccination.