Personalization from Customer Data Aggregation Using List Price
研究了企业如何通过客户数据聚合实现个性化定价，并利用标价缓解消费者对多付的疑虑，发现标价能告知市场价格上限，且价格歧视可能使避免多付的消费者受益。
When consumers’ inferences of their reservation values are subject to environmental noise, firms can use customer data aggregation to obtain superior knowledge. This facilitates personalized pricing but may also induce consumer suspicions of overpaying. To alleviate the suspicions and convince consumers of their value, the firm may design its personalization scheme to include a list price in addition to the personalized prices. We find that only a separating equilibrium with list pricing survives the intuitive criterion. Specifically, when consumers underestimate their value, it is essential to use a binding list price to inform the consumers about the market’s price ceiling. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the firm cannot abuse its informational advantage to steer consumers into overestimation, and price discrimination may strictly benefit the consumers who avoid overpaying. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing.