Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises
研究发现，政府若无法自主运用货币政策应对经济波动，在面临流动性危机时更易陷入展期危机。以欧元区债务危机为例，西班牙因缺乏货币自主权而脆弱，最后贷款人可缓解放弃货币独立的代价。
Abstract This article shows that the inability to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization leaves a government more vulnerable to a rollover crisis. We study a sovereign default model with self-fulfilling rollover crises, foreign currency debt, and nominal rigidities. When the government lacks monetary independence, lenders anticipate that the government would face a severe recession in the event of a liquidity crisis and are therefore more prone to run on government bonds. In a quantitative application to the Eurozone debt crisis, we find that the lack of monetary autonomy played a central role in making Spain vulnerable to a rollover crisis. Finally, we argue that a lender of last resort can go a long way toward reducing the costs of giving up monetary independence.