Quid pro Quo: Friendly Information Exchange between Rivals
研究了竞争对手之间如何通过披露信息实现均衡，即使一方获利必然导致另一方损失；揭示了互惠动机和筛选动机如何驱动信息交换，以及耐心个体如何通过持续交替披露达到效率。
We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated -- the quid pro quo motive -- or from the possibility of learning from the rival's failure to act in response to a disclosure -- the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and the number of disclosure rounds grows without bound if the agents' initial information becomes sufficiently diffuse -- in that sense, the less informed agents are the more they talk. Patient individuals can achieve efficiency by means of continuous alternating disclosures of limited amounts of information. This provides a rationale for protracted dialogues.