Less Competition, More Meritocracy?
研究了当参赛者策略性行为时，宽松标准和有限候选人池如何通过减少风险行为，提高选拔与能力的相关性，从而促进精英选拔。
Uncompetitive contests for grades, promotions, retention, and job assignments, which feature lax standards and limited candidate pools, are often criticized for being unmeritocratic. We show that when contestants are strategic, lax standards and exclusivity can make selection more meritocratic. When many contestants compete for a few promotions, strategic contestants adopt high-risk strategies. Risk-taking reduces the correlation between performance and ability. Through reducing the effects of risk-taking, “Peter principle” promotion policies, which entail promoting some contestants that are unlikely to be worthy, can increase the overall correlation between selection and ability and thus further meritocracy.