从管理组织资本衡量系统性风险

Measuring systematic risk from managerial organization capital

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · 2021
被引 4
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

将组织资本分解为可转移的经济租金(高管薪酬)和战略成分(含代理成本),发现战略成分高的公司股东每年获得4.6%的系统性风险溢价,而信息披露和公司治理可消除该溢价。

Abstract

Abstract Organization capital (OC) constitutes a firm's unique, hard‐to‐mimic, hard‐to‐transfer culture, internal knowledge and language, policies and procedures, growth opportunities and information technology, brand name and any other aspects that are not directly related to the production process. In order to disentangle value enhancement from agency costs inherent in the OC, we calibrate systematic risk premiums from the loss of managerial OC rents by decomposing OC into: (1) portable economic rents in the form of disclosed executive compensation and (2) a strategic component that comprised undisclosed, non‐portable OC rents mixed with agency costs. Shareholders in firms with high strategic component (not the portable component) earn an annual systematic risk premium of 4.6%. Disclosures revealing the breakdown between OC and agency costs in the strategic component (earnings surprises, managerial obfuscation and stock mispricing) as well as corporate governance eliminate this risk premium by revealing the OC rents in strategic component and increasing OC portability.

组织资本系统性风险溢价管理层租金公司治理