Private Lenders' Use of Analyst Earnings Forecasts When Establishing Debt Covenant Thresholds
研究发现，在包含盈利契约的债务合同中，当分析师历史预测更准确时，盈利阈值更接近分析师预测；分析师预测可用性下降后，合同更少包含盈利契约，表明贷款人将分析师预测作为设定契约阈值的参考。
ABSTRACT We examine whether lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower's earnings as inputs when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. We find that, among debt contracts that include an earnings covenant, earnings thresholds are set closer to analyst forecasts when analysts have historically issued more accurate earnings forecasts. These results are robust to firm fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. Further, we find that, following a plausibly exogenous decline in the availability of analyst earnings forecasts, debt contracts are less likely to include earnings covenants. Our evidence is consistent with lenders using analyst earnings forecasts as an input when establishing debt covenant thresholds and suggests sell-side analysts play a role in debt contracting.