Strategic Complements or Substitutes? The Case of Adopting Health Information Technology by U.S. Hospitals
研究了美国医院采用电子病历的决策是战略互补还是替代，发现存在互补性，并构建动态寡头模型分析战略时机激励，模拟显示奖励协调的激励计划比单纯奖励采用更能促进互操作性。
Abstract This paper explores the adoption choice of electronic medical records by U.S. hospitals, which could exhibit strategic complements or substitutes. I find complementarities in adoption through a reduced-form analysis with instruments for unobserved market characteristics. I further develop a dynamic oligopoly model to allow for strategic timing incentives that are missing in the static model. Adopting a dominant local vendor could increase per period profits from adoption by 9.2% over choosing a marginal vendor. A counterfactual analysis suggests that an incentive program rewarding coordination, not just adoption, is more effective in achieving interoperability, especially before the widespread adoption of the technology.