Do companies try to conceal financial misstatements through auditor shopping?
研究发现，存在财务错报的公司更可能通过更换审计师来掩盖问题，否则错报可能更早被发现；这种行为会导致CEO、CFO和审计委员会成员更替，但有效的监督能抑制此行为。
Abstract Prior studies on auditor shopping primarily focused on the motivation to avoid unfavorable audit opinions, such as going concern and modified opinion. In this study, we show that companies that misstate their financial statements engage in auditor shopping to try to conceal the financial misstatements. In other words, their misstatements would have been discovered sooner had they made an opposite “replace or retain” auditor decision. We further show that engagement in auditor shopping results in a higher turnover of the CEO, the CFO and audit committee members but only when auditor shopping involves auditor dismissal. Thus, we document the negative consequences of engaging in auditor shopping. Finally, we show that effective monitoring curbs auditor shopping. Our findings should be of interest to regulators who continue to express concerns over this practice as well as to senior managers and audit committee members.