Corporate‐level influences on internal capital allocation: The role of financial analyst performance projections
研究发现，公司管理者并非完全按照部门业绩进行内部资本配置，而是受分析师对公司整体业绩预测的影响，当预测低于或高于预期时，管理者会偏离优胜者选择策略，且这种偏离受部门相关性和资产耐用性的调节。
Abstract Research contends that internal capital should be allocated in proportion to divisional performance, but scholars are often puzzled to find that managers do not adhere to this winner‐picking approach. We argue this is because scholarship has not incorporated corporate‐level factors that influence how corporate managers structure holistic capital allocation strategies. In this study, we build on the behavioral theory of the firm to focus on analyst performance projections for multidivisional corporations and how they inform corporate managers' allocation strategies. Specifically, we theorize corporate managers deviate from the winner‐picking allocation approach owing to search‐related behaviors stemming from projected performance below or above expectations. We further theorize about conditions that offer corporate managers opportunities to deviate from winner‐picking, focusing particularly on multidivisional relatedness and asset durability.