Long-Term Climate Treaties with a Refunding Club
研究了一种“退款俱乐部”机制，通过初始缴费和按减排成效返还资金，同时解决参与减排联盟和自愿遵守减排目标这两个搭便车问题，并探讨了促进参与、兼顾公平和减轻初始资金负担的方法。
We show that an appropriately-designed "Refunding Club" can simultaneously solve both free-riding problems in mitigating climate change-participating in a coalition with an emission reduction target and enduring voluntary compliance with the target once the coalition has been formed. Countries in the Club pay an initial fee into a fund that is invested in assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the Club members in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved, suitably rescaled by a weighting factor. We show that an appropriate refunding scheme can implement any feasible abatement path a Club wants to implement. The contributions to the initial fund can be used to disentangle efficiency and distributional concerns and/or to make a coalition stable. Making the grand coalition stable in the so-called "modesty approach" requires less than 0.5% of World GDP. Finally, we suggest ways to foster initial participation, to incorporate equity concerns with regard to developing countries, and ways to ease the burden to fill the initial fund.