The effect of observing multiple private information outcomes on the inclination to cheat
研究当代理人报告多个随机事件结果而非单一结果时，作弊倾向如何变化。多个结果使极端值罕见，便于识别机会主义行为并引发声誉担忧，从而大幅减少严重作弊，但也降低了说谎的内在成本，导致普遍小幅上调结果，整体作弊程度仅略有下降。
Abstract We investigate how the inclination to cheat changes when agents report the result of multiple realizations of a (private information) stochastic event rather than a single outcome. Multiple realizations render extreme outcomes unlikely, facilitating the identification of opportunistic behaviors and exposing to reputation concerns the individuals who report them. Consequently, multiple realizations lead to a significant reduction of cheating by large amounts. Simultaneously multiple realizations also diminish the intrinsic cost of lying, thereby inducing a widespread inclination to adjust upward the observed outcome in a plausible manner. The overall effect is only a marginal decrease in the degree of cheating.