Welfare Consequences of Sustainable Finance
研究了限制投资者仅持有净零碳排放企业的指令的福利后果，发现福利最大化的指令接近最优解，能通过缓解碳排放导致的天气灾害风险带来福利收益。
Abstract We model the welfare consequences of mandates that restrict investors to hold firms with net-zero carbon emissions. To qualify for these mandates, value-maximizing firms have to accumulate decarbonization capital. Qualification lowers a firm’s required return by its decarbonization investments divided by Tobin’s q, that is, the greenium or the dividend yield shareholders forgo to address the global-warming externality. The welfare-maximizing mandate approximates the first-best solution, yielding welfare gains compared to laissez-faire by mitigating the weather disaster risks resulting from carbon emissions. Our model generates optimal transition paths for decarbonization that we use to evaluate proposed net-zero targets. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online