Private firms’ incentives and opportunities to manage earnings: Evidence from the use of inflation adjustments
研究了哥伦比亚2007年取消通胀调整制度前后大量私营企业的行为，发现企业通过操纵通胀调整避免报告小额亏损，依赖银行融资的企业操纵更甚，且操纵盈余的企业次年获得更多银行贷款；制度取消后，企业转而通过出售有形资产等非经常性损益来粉饰利润。
Abstract We examine the behavior of a large sample of private firms before and after the elimination of an inflation adjustment system in Colombia in 2007. We find that firms avoid reporting small pre‐tax losses by exercising considerable discretion in their use of inflation adjustments and find that this discretion is greater for firms that rely more on bank financing. Furthermore, firms that manage earnings to report small positive profits issue more bank debt the year following the reporting. After the law change, firms resort to other means to report positive earnings. In particular, the use of non‐operating earnings increases, attributable in part to a higher incidence of tangible asset sales.