Two-stage contests with preferences over style
研究两阶段竞赛中，设计者既关心申请质量又关心风格时，是否引入初筛阶段、晋级规则及是否公布晋级人数等决策对均衡结果和设计者收益的影响。
Abstract Many grant applications have a preliminary stage where only a select group are invited to submit a full application. Similarly, procurement contracts by governments are often awarded through a two-stage procedure. We model and analyze such environments where the designer cares about the style of the application as well as its quality. The designer has the option of choosing an initial stage, where contestants can enter and learn about their desirability while the designer learns about their style. We determine closed form solutions for equilibrium outcomes and designer payoffs and use this to analyze whether or not a second stage is desirable, different rules for deciding who will advance, and whether or not to communicate the number of contestants that qualify for the second stage.