Uncertainty and the Bank of England's MPC
研究了不确定性指标如何影响英格兰银行货币政策委员会成员的投票行为，发现不确定性通常促使委员投票支持宽松政策，且内部不确定性指数对投票行为影响显著。
Abstract We investigate how recently developed measures of uncertainty affect the voting behavior of individual Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members. To determine the precise impact of uncertainty on individual policymakers, we estimate the standard errors of member‐specific parameters in a random parameters ordered probit framework. We find that uncertainty is typically associated with voting to ease the policy stance. The Bank of England's in‐house uncertainty index plays a prominent role in driving voting behavior. Based on this measure, the MPC emerges as a diverse group of activist risk managers.