Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
研究了广义指派问题中核心的稳定性，证明核心是唯一满足弱占优和序列占优关系的稳定集，对非拟线性偏好下的市场设计有参考价值。
We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear.