Negative bubbles and the market for “dreams”: “Lemons” in the looking glass
扩展了阿克洛夫的逆向选择模型，指出“柠檬”不仅导致市场崩溃，还可能引发负泡沫；同时，当不知情参与者追逐财富梦想时，可能形成正泡沫，最终迫使知情专家退出。
Abstract I extend Akerlof's adverse selection model, where uninformed participants withdraw from the market, and show that rather than collapse, “lemons” can, and often do, lead to a negative bubble. I then show that a mirror image of his model, where uninformed participants pursue “dreams” of becoming wealthy (e.g., trading in cryptocurrencies), can lead to a positive bubble that ultimately causes informed experts to withdraw when the supply of assets is finite. I also argue that, because prices of antiques, collectibles, and other objets d'art are typically based primarily on sentiment, fad, and/or fashion, such assets trade persistently in a positive bubble.