Justified Communication Equilibrium
提出正当沟通均衡（JCE）作为廉价谈话信号博弈的均衡精炼，在接收者初始信任且发送者博弈次数远多于接收者的非均衡学习中，策略组合需为JCE才能成为稳定结果。
Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games.