Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
研究在选民有异质性偏好和私人信号的大多数选举中，贝叶斯说服者如何通过提供额外信息实现任意状态依赖结果，且该机制在15人小委员会中也有效。
This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private signals. We show that a Bayesian persuader can implement any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's information, a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds. Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters' private information and preferences: the same additional information is effective across environments. The results require almost no commitment power by the persuader. Finally, the persuasion mechanism is effective also in small committees with as few as 15 members.