Fiscal easing in local governments facing potential merger: Visible in budgets or hidden in overruns?
研究挪威地方政府在面临潜在合并时，财政宽松主要表现为预算超支而非公开预算调整，且不情愿合并的政府宽松程度更大、更倾向于隐藏策略。
Abstract Mergers incentivize local governments to ease their fiscal policies before the merger is implemented. This incentive is powerful: it is known that local governments start easing fiscal policies even before they know for sure that a merger will occur and even if merging is what they want. Based on a study of Norwegian municipalities, this article shows that irrespective of whether local governments face certain or potential mergers, their fiscal easing is manifested primarily in budget overruns rather than candidly documented in budgets. Among local governments facing a potential merger, unwilling governments ease their fiscal policies more than willing ones do and to a larger extent apply a concealment strategy.