Contracting in Peer Networks
研究了当员工将自己的工资与同行比较时，企业如何设计最优契约，发现工资比较会削弱绩效比较的效果，导致工资与同行产出正相关，且多企业竞争时会出现“工资竞赛”，降低利润和效率。
ABSTRACT We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of their peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals, a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.