Marketing contract choices in agriculture: The role of price expectation and price risk management
研究了法国谷物生产者选择营销合同（如远期合同）时，套期保值和价格提升动机的作用，发现风险厌恶或价格风险增加时，价格提升动机影响减弱。
Abstract We identify factors involved in the decision of farmers to use marketing contracts (pool, storage and forward contracts), and we explicitly account for the hedging and price‐enhancement components of this decision. Using panel corner solution models (Tobit and double‐hurdle) to represent farmers’ contracting decision using a sample of French cereal producers, we find that both the hedging and the price‐enhancement motives are important factors driving marketing choices. When risk aversion or exposure to price risk rises, the price‐enhancement motive becomes less influential. Farmers appear to be more reluctant to base their marketing decisions on their price expectations in that case.