FIGHTING COLLUSION: AN IMPLEMENTATION THEORY APPROACH
研究了竞争当局如何在企业仅知成本且可合谋的情况下，通过重复博弈设计机制，使企业无法欺骗当局并实现既定产出目标，给出了可重复实施的条件并分析了竞争产出的可实施性。
Abstract A competition authority (CA) has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is repeatedly implementable if the firms cannot collude and deceive the CA in equilibrium. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for repeated implementation when firms can only announce prices and quantities. We use these conditions to study when the competitive output is implementable. We extend the analysis to the case when the firms can also supply hard evidence.