Strategic Nondisclosure in Takeovers
研究了收购中知情竞标者选择不披露有利信息以压低收购价格的现象，发现更强竞争反而可能损害目标股东利益，对促进竞争和披露的政策提出警示。
ABSTRACT We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. The informed bidder's information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We show that withholding information creates a winner's curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival's participation. In turn, an endogenous disclosure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price—breaking down the standard unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders' payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare, but increasing shareholders' payoff. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure. JEL Classifications: D44; D82; G34; M41.