Credit risk in colonial India
本文挑战殖民时期印度信贷稀缺且昂贵的传统解释，基于马德拉斯管辖区的新证据，发现气候波动和执行成本共同塑造了信贷供给与价格，放贷人通过配给和差异化合同应对风险。
Abstract Credit was scarce and expensive in colonial India. Existing explanations assume a lack of market competition let moneylenders charge high interest rates. The article challenges this view and constructs a novel framework to explain the rationality and strategies of lenders. Using new evidence from the Madras Presidency, the study finds that the interconnected issues of climate volatility and enforcement costs shaped the supply and prices of credit. Climate volatility and uncertain seasonal incomes led to high default rates. Enforcement of contracts through courts was expensive and not appropriate where there was no wilful breach of contract. Moneylenders responded to risk in innovative ways. They rationed credit and imposed inflexible enforcement terms in the dry regions that faced higher climatic risk, but used contracts and flexible pricing strategies in the irrigated zones where risks were lower.