The potential for moral hazard behavior in irrigation decisions under crop insurance
通过数值模拟研究农作物保险是否影响农民季节性灌溉用水决策，发现当前成本下道德风险可能性低，但灌溉成本高时存在风险，且保险可能增加用水，需关注其副作用。
Abstract The design of federal crop insurance has attracted the interest and attention of many economists and policymakers in the United States. Moral hazard is a frequently cited concern, as insurance may reduce the incentive for farmers to manage properly their agricultural operation. Moral hazard could play a role in irrigation decisions by incentivizing a farmer to choose a riskier irrigation management strategy, potentially affecting the long‐term sustainability of water resources. We use numerical simulation to determine if insurance coverage affects incentives on seasonal irrigation use. Results show that the potential for moral hazard at current costs and policy parameters is low, but that there is potential for moral hazard behavior when the cost of irrigation is high. Hence, conservation policies that increase the cost of irrigation cost (e.g., a water tax) may amplify the potential for moral hazard. In most cases, crop insurance provides a secondary effect that reduces irrigation use in addition to the direct water tax effect, although this reduction comes at increased taxpayer expense. However, it is possible that irrigation use increases under crop insurance. Therefore, there is a need for the explicit consideration of the unintended side effects of crop insurance on farmers’ irrigation water use decisions, particularly in regions experiencing water scarcity and rising marginal costs of irrigation.