Influential news and policy-making
研究影响误报成本的干预措施对媒体与选民之间沟通的影响，发现提高成本可能增加误报和说服，而低成本则导致完全披露，选民在信息较少时可能更好。
Abstract This paper analyzes the implications of interventions that affect the costs of misreporting. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by the two candidates. I show that higher costs may lead to more misreporting and persuasion, whereas low costs result in full revelation. The voter may be better off when less informed because of higher costs. When the media receives policy-independent gains, interventions that increase misreporting costs never directly harm the voter. However, lenient interventions that increase these costs by small amounts can be wasteful of public resources. Regulation produced by politicians leads to suboptimal interventions.