Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation
通过实验检验增强与收益无关的焦点（Schelling, 1960）的显著性，能否抵消利益冲突对协调的负面影响。结果发现，在冲突程度恒定的博弈中支持该猜想，但在收益不平等和效率不同的博弈中不支持。
We experimentally test whether increasing the salience of payoff-irrelevant focal points (Schelling, 1960) can counteract the negative impact of conflicts of interest on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience increases its relevance and, therefore, coordination success. When we vary label salience between subjects, we find support for this conjecture in games with a constant degree of conflict, similar to battle of the sexes games, but not in games that feature outcomes with different degrees of payoff inequality and efficiency. In an additional experiment in which we vary label salience within subjects, choices are found not to be affected by our salience manipulation. Yet, the proportion of choices consistent with the focal point is significantly greater than that in the between-subject design.