The role of credit default swaps in determining corporate payout policy
研究发现，当公司债务上开始交易信用违约互换后，公司会增加对股东的支付，这主要是因为债权人监督减弱，而非债权人因持有CDS而变得更强硬。
Abstract We examine how the introduction of credit default swap (CDS) trading on the debt of individual firms affects corporate payout policy. We find that firms increase payouts to shareholders after the introduction of CDS trading on their debt. This suggests that CDS‐referenced firms are more likely to be affected by decreased creditor monitoring than by tougher CDS‐insured creditors when determining total payout amount. Moreover, the increase in payouts after CDS introduction is more pronounced in firms with smaller institutional ownership and greater bank debt dependency. Finally, we show that CDS‐referenced firms tend to prefer stock repurchases that have a financial flexibility advantage over dividends to protect against the potential threat of tougher CDS‐insured creditors.