Full farsighted rationality
提出“完全远见”概念，通过扩展预期函数和三条理性公理，刻画了联盟在博弈中考虑维持现状选项时的理性行为，为理解长期博弈结果提供新视角。
An abstract game consists of a set of states, preferences over states, and an effectivity correspondence specifying what coalitions are allowed to replace one state by another one. Agents are called farsighted if, when deciding whether to support a coalition's move, they compare the status quo to the long term outcome following their deviation. Yet, this definition of farsightedness ignores a coalition's option to remain at the status quo allowing another coalition to move: agents are not fully farsighted. Therefore, we introduce extended expectation functions, which assign to each state a list of pairs consisting of a state and a coalition that is expected to move from the former to the latter. They endow agents with an expectation about what any deviation vis-a-vis maintaining the status quo entails. We impose three rationality axioms and provide a characterization of extended expectation functions that satisfy our axioms in terms of coalition behavior.