Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt
研究了政府支出惯性如何影响债务可持续性，发现惯性可能通过保险机制减少政治家积累债务的动机，但政治极化会加剧对惯性项目的偏好，解释美国强制性支出占比上升。
Once established, government spending programs tend to continue. A commonly held view is that spending inertia leads to unsustainable debt, ultimately requiring fiscal adjustments such as “sequestration.” We show that by insuring against political turnover, inertia may reduce politicians’ incentives to accumulate debt. However, large preexisting commitments and the prospect of future stabilization can lead to overspending to dilute past administrations’ commitments. Finally, we show that political polarization amplifies incentives to prioritize inertial programs, potentially explaining the increased share of mandatory spending in the US budget.