Evolutionary multiplayer game analysis of accounts receivable financing based on supply chain financing
将核心企业引入传统应收账款融资模型，用博弈论分析银行、中小企业和核心企业的战略决策稳定性，并通过仿真验证该模式能降低银行风险、提升信用，实现三方共赢。
This paper introduces the core enterprise into the traditional accounts receivable financing model, which only includes the bank and the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME), and further analyses the strategic decisions of the bank, the SME, and the core enterprise by applying game theory. The stability of strategic decisions is also analysed. Finally, we prove the usability of the pledged financing mode of accounts receivable based on supply chain finance through simulation analysis and evolutionary game theory. Research results show that adding the core enterprise to the traditional accounts receivable financing model can reduce the bank’s loan risk to a certain extent, enhance the credibility of the accounts receivable, which will be beneficial to the realisation of accounts receivable financing. The successful operation of accounts receivable financing mode will help the three parties to achieve three-win results. In addition, the lending rate of the bank and the reputation loss suffered by the core enterprise due to default will affect the evolutionary equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game.