Data brokers co-opetition
研究了数据经纪人在共享消费者数据的同时又相互竞争销售的行为，分析了数据合并价值与成本的关系如何影响其共享或竞争策略。
Abstract Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a ‘co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are ‘sub-additive’ with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are ‘super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.