Respecting entitlements in legislative bargaining: A matter of preference or necessity?
通过实验室实验，研究在立法谈判中公平关切是否会压倒策略行为，发现经验丰富的提议者中超过三分之一会提出极端分配方案，且过去观察到极端结果会增加自身提出极端方案的可能性。
Abstract We investigate whether fairness concerns overrule strategic behaviour in legislative bargaining with entitlements. In a lab experiment, we vary bargaining power by using either majority rule or dictator rule to implement a division. We apply coarse measures in order to assess whether entitlements are respected. Our results show that with experience over one third of proposers make “extreme” offers, assigning at most 10% of the surplus to partners whose consent is not needed under the respective rule. Having observed extreme outcomes in the past increases the likelihood of own extreme proposals. Overall, we find significant limitations in the acknowledgment for others' entitlements, in particular for groups in which individual contributions differ.