Power or Luck? The Limitations of the European Commission's Agenda Setting Power and Autonomous Policy Influence
研究欧盟委员会的政策优先事项与其他关键机构（欧洲理事会、欧洲议会、欧盟理事会主席国）的优先事项是否一致，发现委员会的成功更多取决于其议题是否已被其他机构关注，而非其自主影响力。
Abstract Building on the existing research on the European Commission's agenda‐setting powers, this study examines the relationship between the policy priorities of the Commission and those of the other key policy actors in the European Union to determine the impact of other EU institutional actor preferences on the success of Commission priority initiatives. By using new and existing datasets to compare the European Commission's Work Programmes with European Council Summit Conclusions, the European Parliament's own initiative reports and Council Presidency Work Programmes, we are able to analyse the effect of policy priority congruence on the Commission's success and measure the autonomous policy influence of the Commission more accurately. Our results demonstrate that the Commission's priority initiatives are significantly more likely to result in legislative outcomes when they address policy topics already highlighted (whether fortuitously or as a result of Commission efforts) by the other key EU institutions. They also suggest that interpretations of the EU political system that ascribe the role of political executive to the Commission misconstrue its role.