Short-Termism Spillovers from the Financial Industry
研究发现，为达到短期业绩目标，银行会加强执行贷款契约中的违约条款，这种短视行为会溢出到借款企业，导致企业更换银行、支付更高利差并减少投资。
Abstract To meet short-term benchmarks, lenders may alter their monitoring behavior, providing a channel for short-termism to spill over to their borrowers. We find that short-termist lenders are significantly more likely to enforce covenant breaches. This behavior is pronounced when performance benchmarks are precise or salient, and when managers have high pay-performance sensitivity, but not when they face strong shareholder governance. Affected borrowers are more likely to switch lenders, pay higher spreads on renegotiated loans, and reduce investment. Our findings suggest that bank managers trade off relationship capital for income-boosting fees and term changes from covenant enforcement to meet earnings benchmarks.