Noncompliance with SEC regulations: evidence from timely loan disclosures
利用重大借款的8-K文件，研究发现企业更可能隐藏高利差和严格财务契约的贷款，并利用重要性定义的模糊性选择性披露，而投资者关注和分析师跟踪会减少隐藏行为。
Abstract We use required 8-K filings around major borrowings to shed light on firms’ choices of whether to comply with SEC disclosure rules. Exploiting within-firm variation, we find that firms are more likely to hide loans with high spreads and tight financial covenants. We further find that firms appear to exploit the ambiguity of the definition of materiality, as they are more likely to selectively disclose (hide) “immaterial” loans when interest rates are low (high). Firms are less likely to hide loans when investors anticipate borrowing during asset acquisition, when firms are followed by more equity analysts or receive more investor attention, and when the firms’ stock prices are more volatile. Lastly, we provide evidence that the SEC does not rigorously enforce compliance with 8-K loan disclosures.