Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment
构建一个两期世代交叠模型，分析家庭结构与犯罪决策的内生关系，发现严厉的犯罪镇压可能因破坏双亲家庭而适得其反，增加罪犯子女的犯罪概率，并解释城市贫民窟中破碎家庭与高犯罪率的持续存在。
We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which both the structure of the family and the decision to commit crime are endogenous and a culture of honesty is transmitted intergenerationally by families and peers. Having a father at home might be crucial to prevent susceptible boys from becoming criminals, as this facilitates the transmission of the honesty trait against criminal behavior. By "destroying" biparental families and putting fathers in prison, we show that more intense crime repression can backfire because it increases the possibility that criminals' sons become criminals themselves. Consistent with sociological disorganization theories of crime, the model also explains the emergence and persistence of urban ghettos characterized by a large proportion of broken families and high crime rates. This is because for children who come from these broken families, negative community experiences (peer effects) further encourage their criminal participation. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of location and family policies on long-term crime rates.