Efficiency and Equilibrium in Network Games: An Experiment
通过实验研究网络博弈中效率与均衡的权衡，发现简单网络中参与者能建立合作规范，但复杂不对称网络中规范消失，行为收敛至纳什均衡。
Abstract The tension between efficiency and equilibrium is a central feature of economic systems. We examine this tradeoff in a network game with a unique Nash equilibrium in which agents can achieve a higher payoff by following a “collaborative norm.” Subjects establish and maintain a collaborative norm in the circle, but the norm weakens with the introduction of one hub connected to everyone in the wheel. In complex and asymmetric networks of 15 and 21 nodes, the norm disappears and subjects' play converges to Nash. We provide evidence that subjects base their decisions on their degree, rather than the overall network structure.