MULTI‐AGENT PERSUASION: LEVERAGING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
研究一个委托人如何通过信息披露，利用多个代理人之间的策略不确定性，促使他们采取特定行动组合，即使代理人可以选择是否接收信息。
Abstract A principal wishes to persuade multiple agents to take a particular action profile. Each agent cares about both a payoff‐relevant state and other agents' actions. The principal discloses information about the state to control the agents' behavior by using their strategic uncertainty. We show that for any nondegenerate prior, the principal can persuade the agents to take an action profile as a unique rationalizable outcome if that action profile satisfies a generalization of risk dominance. Moreover, this result remains true even if each of the agents is allowed to strategically choose whether to receive information from the principal or not.