Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience’s preferences are uncertain
研究了当企业不确定受众偏好且风险规避时，为何有些企业选择沉默而非披露信息，沉默能降低企业收益对受众偏好的敏感度，解释了为何企业面对多元受众时不披露盈利细分、高管薪酬或ESG表现。
We examine voluntary disclosure decisions when firms are uncertain about audience preferences and are risk averse. In contrast to classic “unraveling” results, some firms remain silent in equilibrium. Silence is safer than disclosure; silence reduces the sensitivity of a firm’s payoff to audience preferences. Increases in firm (audience) risk-aversion reduce (increase) disclosure. Our model explains why some firms do not disclose earnings breakdowns, executive compensation, or Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance when they face diverse audiences, and why they disclose less under regulatory rules mandating that disclosure be entirely public.